Nantes in their sights.

11. Attack On Nantes.
Nantes was a tough military target, the major part lying on the northern bank of the Loire, the rest on two islands between two branches of the river. Access from the south was across three well-fortified bridges. The major part of the Vendéen forces would therefore have to fight its way into the city from the north through suburbs containing a substantially hostile population.
Although riven by serious fratricidal political infighting and regarded with deep suspicion by the Convention in Paris, the citizens of Nantes managed to put aside their differences as they desperately tried to organise the defence of their city.
This was in the hands of the mayor of Nantes, Baco, and General Canclaux, commander of the coastal army at Brest, a former aristocrat and career officer who had recently arrived with 2000 seasoned troops.
At their disposal they had about a total of 12,000 fighting men of variable quality, though every citizen was considered able to fight. Military support promised from other areas failed to materialise as they too looked to their defences. The city would have to rely on its own resources.
In preparation for the attack, every available weapon was bought from the arms' manufacturers, commercial riverboats were armed with cannon and money raised. A large number of Dutch sailors transiting through the port and trapped by the fighting, were conscripted to fight. They did so willingly as most were in sympathy with the aims of the French Revolution.
Redoubts for holding troops were thrown up just outside the city, defended by cannon and linked by trenches. The lens maker Fedraglio was ordered to the top of the cathedral tower with his telescopes to report on enemy troop movements and provide early warning of their approach.
When it came, the Vendéen ultimatum, kept secret from the people, was summarily rejected. However, seeing the strength of the approaching forces, two representants en mission who were trapped in the city ordered its evacuation and surrender, but local citizens stopped them leaving by unhitching the oxen from their wagon.
The plan was quite straightforward: with a strength of approximately 40,000 men (who had now answered the call to arms again), the Royal and Catholic Army would launch a simultaneous four-pronged assault on the city, from the north, the east and one across the river from the south. One exit from the city was to be left open to encourage the defenders to flee.
On 28th June 1793, Charette opened the attack as agreed with artillery barrages from the south, his troops meeting stiff resistance as they tried to advance. Surprisingly however, there was no co-ordinated gunfire from the army to the north and east as expected. Stubborn resistance from outlying defensive points had held up Bonchamps' advance. In the evening, feeling the whole attack had gone awry and running short of ammunition, Charette withdrew his forces, without making any attempt to communicate with the other columns.
Canclaux was able to reinforce the northern and eastern garrisons with those from the south.
The next day the remaining columns attacked. Progress was slow as the Nantais were well dug-in, many buildings having been made into strong points. Unused to prolonged house-to-house and hand-to-hand fighting, perhaps expecting an easy victory like Angers, the Vendéen troops were hesitant, taking serious casualties.
Disobeying orders, the Due de Talmond closed the escape route for the defenders who were preparing to flee. Completely surrounded, they fought like men possessed.
Then came the great blow. In close street fighting, Cathelineau fell, mortally wounded.
Immediately, the attack faltered as the troops in his column began to retreat, followed quickly by the others. Without the so-called "Saint of Anjou" to lead them, the men would not fight, despite his deathbed pleadings and those of the other leaders.
The failure of the attack on Nantes had probably saved the Republic.


12. The Republican Response.
On 26th July, a member of the comité de salut public (the executive committee of the Revolutionary Government), Barère, made this speech,
"The Committee of Public Safety has prepared measures to exterminate this race of rebels, to destroy their farms, burn their forests and cut down their harvests, just as medicine uses fire and steel to destroy gangrene (..........) so must political medicine use the same methods and remedies. "
On 1st August 1793 the Convention in Paris ordered the total destruction of the Vendee Militaire.
Such was the rage against the insurgent region that the name of one Department was later changed from Vendée toVengée (Revenge or Vengeance) as were the names of sometowns to make them sound more revolutionary:

Chaize-le-Vicomte became Haute-Chaize
Fontenay-le-Comte - Fontenay-le-Peuple
Mouilleron-le-Captif - MouIlleron-le-Libre
St. Gilles-sur-Vie - Port-Fidèle
St. Hilaire-du-Bois - La Courageuse
St. Michel-en-l'Herm - L'Union-sur-Mer
St. Paul-en-Pareds - La Régénérée
St. Philbert-du-Pont Charrault - La Résolue
St. Sulpice-en-Pareds - La Fertile
L'île de Yeu - L'île de la Réunion


In 1795 the original names were readopted, largely for military reasons, but also as a gesture of reconciliation
At the same time, any Republicans remaining in the region were ordered to leave, adding to the flow of these refugees who were already regarded with suspicion by the authorities - a number of rebel spies had been found, usually carrying passports for the republican and Vendéen zones. Whilst many cities did their best to accommodate them, others were left penniless and unhoused or were simply arrested and became forced labour.
With Nantes safely in republican hands, the insurgent region was effectively cut off from the outside world and surrounded by ever strengthening republican forces that could attack from whichever direction they chose, putting the rebels constantly on the defensive.
However whilst the Vendée Militaire had a finite number of men who could bear arms and who could not be replaced, the Republic could continue to send more and more troops to the area, slowly wearing them down. Though they could continue to win victories within the region, the Vendéens would eventually be overwhelmed by sheer force of numbers.


The Vendée Militaire would literally bleed to death.


Though not immediately apparent to all, this situation was clear to some of the generals (particularly Bonchamps) who knew that the region could not continue to fight on alone indefinitely and who foresaw it effectively being squeezed like an orange by the surrounding forces.
Their situation was still being made worse by the constant and continuing squabbles amongst the Generals who were even more inclined to stay in their own little areas. Attempts to reunify the command failed again.
Before the Vendéens could recover from their defeat at Nantes, General Westermann, coming from the south-east, chased les Blancs out of Parthenay in a night attack (the rebels almost never put out guards at night, even when ordered to, leaving themselves wide open to such attacks).
His troops then captured Châtillon (nowadays called Mauléon), the political and emotional heart of the region, with its printing presses, reserves of ammunition and supplies. The town was also the seat of the Vendéen Grand Council, an embryonic governing body for the region, made up largely of civilians.
As an augury of things to come, Westermann adopted a scorched-earth policy as he advanced, with its accompanying devastation. The chateau homes of the La Rochejaquelein, La Durbelière, and Clisson, residence of Lescure, were both sacked and burnt, as were villages and farms on the republican route.
Particular targets were the thousands of windmills throughout the region, essential for grinding flour in the days before electricity. Perched high on hills and therefore visible for miles around, Vendeen troops used their sails to indicate the presence and. whereabouts of the enemy and to order assemblies of troops (see page 105).
For the sake of the morale of their followers, the Whites had to recapture Châtillon immediately.
The counter-attack by 25000 men was quick, unexpected and merciless. Westermann lost 4000 dead and wounded with the same number taken prisoner. The artillery and baggage train together with many of his troops, who had panicked, fell to their destruction in a ravine.
In all the Vendéens now held over 60,000 prisoners, a serious drain on food and other resources. Most were simply liberated, after being shaved, whether they promised not to fight in the area again or not, and given a safe conduct to their own lines. Needless to say, the Republicans did not recognise promises made to rebels and pressed them back into service immediately.
Mindful of the danger of allowing the region to become encircled, Bonchamps now attempted to break out and establish a second front on the north bank of the Loire, linking up with rebels in Brittany. He therefore attacked Angers again. But the city, reinforced, rallied and he failed. Other attacks on Doué and Thouars (again) to the east failed.
Similar attempts were made against Luçon in great flat plain the south-west, with a view to obtaining a route to the sea, but again the 40,000 Vendéens failed to break out of the gathering ring of steel, in three hard fought battles. These defeats were largely caused by the unwillingness of their leaders to cooperate in the field, as well as the army's inexperience at fighting set-piece battles.
The noose was tightening.
There were now something over 150,000 republican troops surrounding the area including the Armée de Mayence, led by Kléber, experienced front line troops and probably the toughest fighting force available to the Convention, sent to reinforce existing units and to act as the executioner of the Vendéens. Ironically these troops still wore the white uniforms of the Royal Army because blue ones were in short supply.
However as with all republican troops, each soldier wore a red, white and blue cockade in his hat, symbol of loyalty to the Revolution.
Their orders were quite simple: destroy the Vendée Militaire completely - to achieve no less than the total genocide ordered by the Convention.
However before that they had to defeat the rebels, which was no small matter.
On 8th September, the advanced guard began sweeping down the west coast from Nantes, often marching in ranks with fixed bayonets, with Charette's army retreating in good order before them.
This however was a new and total war - villages were pillaged and burnt, women raped and massacred. Any men caught were slaughtered like animals. Following the fighting men were the "vautours des champs de bataille" (literally, "vultures of the battlefields"), scavengers who bought plunder from the soldiers for next to nothing and finished off anyone left alive after their passage.
However despite stunning victories against republican columns advancing from the south and east, including the Armée de Mayence during September at Torfou, Coron and St. Fulgent the Vendéen forces were gradually forced to concentrate in the Cholet area.
Much of the fighting was now hand-to-hand or using the bayonet, the results bloody. Angered by reports of the brutality of the Mayencais, Les Blancs themselves (who up to that time had been very generous with their captives,) became more brutal, taking fewer prisoners and committing revenge massacres, notably at Clisson.
Their successes however owed as much to the disorganisation of the republican high command and to the interference of the political representatives as to Vendéen prowess and bravery.
But the rebel generals recognised that they were dealing with a different, tougher enemy who had renewed heart. They also knew that a decisive battle was imminent and tried to make plans contingency plans in case of defeat.
What to do? Where to go?
Some leaders wanted to turn south, back into the Vendée Militaire, others wanted to cross the Loire, to abandon the whole region to the mercies of the Republic and make common cause with the rebels in Brittany. Or to obtain aid from the British.
This view was argued strongly by the Duc de Talmond, who had joined the rebels after the capture of Saumur and who had immense estates further north around Laval which he was desperate to liberate from republican control. His plan therefore contained more than a modicum of self-interest.
The war council decided to stay in the region.
But, true to the pattern of disorganisation in the high command, a minority managed to get the decision reversed the next day and sent a small, advanced force to secure a bridgehead on the north bank of the Loire.
If they lost the final battle the population of the Vendée Militaire would abandon their homeland and cross the Loire. But to do what? The aim remained unclear.
Meanwhile advancing republican forces burned Chatillon, Tiffauges, Clisson and Montaigu.
After an indecisive battle at Mortagne, a strong defensive position abandoned when Lescure was mortally wounded, the Vendéens retreated to Cholet. Instead of garrisoning the strong points and defending the town however, they again retreated 17 kilometres further north towards Beaupréau, for reasons that remain unclear. Were they short of ammunition? Was de Talmond's influence predominant, taking the army towards the Loire? Were they worried about the numbers of civilians in Cholet, or the morale of the troops?
On the 17th October, the army turned back to Cholet, sensing perhaps that this was the final battle, the battle for the Vendée Militaire, for their homes and lives. From the distance came the sound of cannon fire as de Talmond and 4000 men attempted to force a bridgehead over the river. Already some civilians were fleeing in that direction.
Some 30-40000 soldier peasants lined up, parish by parish behind their parish captains.
On the right, La Rochejaquelein with the Forest of Cholet at his rear, on the left D'Elbee and Bonchamps. Facing them, 27000 republican troops of whom 12000 had marched all night and were exhausted.
Tired, unsure and demoralised, La Grande Armée Royale et Catholique went into battle, without the usual psalm or hymn singing, without the sound of trumpets, barely even speaking and without their usual battle cry of "Rembarre', ("Into 'em") as if knowing the importance of the coming fight.
The initial charge of La Rochejaquelein's troops forced the Republicans back so that his forward troops were in the suburbs of Cholet, almost breaking the enemy line. Kléber then threw in his reserves under Haxo who gradually forced the Vendéen back.
On the left, there was a similar picture of success, then a republican rally.
The fighting was long and bitter, lasting all day, mainly hand-to-hand in thick smoke, the Vendéens unable to use their sharpshooters. Even the grass in the fields burned.
Bonchamps and d'Elbée charged and charged again until, at dusk, caught in a trap set by Kléber, their troops were cut down by a sudden barrage from hidden artillery.
The peasant army broke and ran, pursued initially by republican troops who killed without mercy, though they were too exhausted themselves to go far.
The Battle of Cholet was lost.
And perhaps worse, d'Elbée and Bonchamps, the only real strategists on the rebel side, lay mortally wounded, the latter reputedly shot by a musket ball from his own ranks. A traitor in the ranks? History is unclear.